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Abstract
We develop a private-information model of union contract negotiations in
which disputes signal a ﬁrm’s willingness to pay. Previous models have
assumed that all labor disputes take the form of a strike. Yet a prominent
feature of U.S. collective bargaining is the holdout: negotiations often
continue without a strike after the contract has expired. Production continues with workers paid according to the expired contract. We analyze
the union’s decision to strike or hold out and highlight its importance to
strike activity. Strikes are more likely to occur after a drop in the real
wage or a decline in unemployment.

Strikes and other costly disputes are commonplace. Yet a theory of why they
happen has been slow to develop. John R. Hicks (1932) concluded that most
strikes result from faulty negotiation. Arthur M. Ross (1948) moved toward an
alternative explanation of strikes by recognizing that union leaders are motivated by personal advancement and the growth of the union. Orley Ashenfelter
and George E. Johnson (1969) developed Ross’s political model of unions into
a theory of strikes.
In the Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) model, strikes occur when the wage
expectations of the rank and ﬁle are out of line with what the ﬁrm is willing
to pay. If the union leaders present a low-wage contract for ratiﬁcation when
the rank and ﬁle’s wage expectations are high, the rank and ﬁle may accuse the
leaders of selling out to management. The union leaders may prefer to strike,
rather than risk dissension within the union. A strike serves to convince the
rank and ﬁle that a high wage is not possible: “the basic function of the strike
is as an equilibrating mechanism to square up the union membership’s wage
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expectations with what the ﬁrm may be prepared to pay” (Ashenfelter and
Johnson, 1969, p. 39). An implication of this theory is that the union’s wage
demands should fall during a strike. A weakness of the theory is that these
wage demands are based on conjecture, rather than derived from a bargaining
process.
Recent developments in noncooperative bargaining theory make it possible
to derive the union’s demands by specifying the bargaining setting in detail.1
Strikes are explained by private information about some aspect critical to reaching agreement, such as the ﬁrm’s willingness to pay.2 Bargainers are uncertain
about each other’s preferences and have incentives to misrepresent private information. Disputes arise as a credible means of communicating this private
information. A ﬁrm with a high willingness to pay prefers to settle at a high
wage without a strike; a ﬁrm with a low willingness to pay prefers to endure a
strike and settle at a low wage. Hence, a ﬁrm with private information about its
willingness to pay can signal this information through its willingness to endure
a strike.
This private-information theory of strikes applies in either the bilateralmonopoly setting, in which a union and ﬁrm are bargaining with asymmetric
information, or the agency model of Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969), in which
the informational problem is between the rank and ﬁle and the union leaders.3
What is essential in both formulations is that private information cannot be
veriﬁed at a low cost. While we agree with Ross (1948) that there are important diﬀerences between the rank and ﬁle and the union leaders, throughout this
paper we analyze the bilateral-monopoly model, because it is more tractable.
Our approach diﬀers from other private-information models of wage bargaining in that we recognize an important feature of U.S. labor negotiations:
workers can continue to work under the terms of the old contract after the contract has expired. Hence, as of the contract expiration date, the union has two
alternatives to settlement: the union can strike, or it can hold out by continuing to work under the expired contract. Prior research has ignored the holdout
option, focusing solely on strikes (see e.g., Drew Fudenberg et al., 1985; Oliver
Hart, 1989; Kennan and Wilson, 1989). We argue that the analysis of labor
negotiations is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by including the holdout option.
In this paper, we develop a bargaining model that includes the union’s threat
decision. We then use the model to interpret data on union contract negotiations. An implication of the model is that the attractiveness of the strike threat
varies with changes in economic variables, such as the real wage and the un1 See John Kennan and Robert Wilson (1989, 1992), Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein (1990), and Ken Binmore et al. (1992) for recent surveys.
2 Other motivations for ineﬃciencies have been presented, such as uncertain commitments
(Vincent P. Crawford, 1982) and multiple equilibria in the bargaining game (Hans Haller and
Steinar Holden, 1990; Raquel Fernandez and Jacob Glazer, 1991). Henry S. Farber and Max
H. Bazerman (1987, 1989) discuss other reasons for bargaining ineﬃciencies.
3 See Brian P. McCall (1990) for an analysis of an agency model in which disputes take the
form of arbitration.
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employment rate. In equilibrium, strikes only occur when the real wage is low.
Only then can the union expect wage gains from a strike that are enough to
oﬀset the higher bargaining costs associated with a strike. This is consistent
with a prominent feature of the strike data: the incidence of strikes increases
when unemployment declines and when the real wage falls.
We begin by presenting new evidence on the extent of strikes and holdouts in
U.S. contract negotiations in Section 1. The evidence suggests a need to expand
existing bargaining models to include the holdout threat. We then present a
private-information model that illustrates the role of strikes and holdouts in
bargaining in Section 2. We argue that including the union’s decision to strike or
hold out will sharpen empirical tests of private-information bargaining models.

1

Strikes and Holdouts: The Data

The empirical features we focus on are bargaining disputes, both strikes and
holdouts. A holdout is deﬁned as the time between the expiration of the previous contract and either the beginning of a strike or the settlement of a new
contract, whichever comes ﬁrst. According to the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, the terms and conditions of employment during the holdout are
governed by the previous contract. The employer may not unilaterally change
these terms until a bargaining impasse is reached. In addition, either party can
elect to increase the bargaining costs by initiating a lockout or a strike.4
Holdouts have received virtually no attention in the empirical literature on
strikes.5 This does not reﬂect a paucity of holdouts in the data. Table 1 summarizes information on holdouts and strikes for the sample of data we focus
on in this paper.6 In our sample of 5,002 contract negotiations involving large
bargaining units (1,000 or more workers) during the period 1970-1989, the incidence of bargaining disputes is 57 percent. Dispute incidence is measured as the
percentage of contract negotiations that involve either strike, lockout, or holdout. Strike incidence is 10 percent, lockout incidence is 0.4 percent, and holdout
4 An exception to this process is the transportation industry, where some of the bargaining
units are covered by the Railway Labor Act (the railroad and airline bargaining units are
covered by the Railway Labor Act, while the maritime, longshore, and trucking bargaining
units are covered by the National Labor Relations Act). Under the Railway Labor Act, a
holdout typically occurs until a series of mediation steps is completed. After this mediation
process is over, a major dispute is often resolved through legislative action rather than through
collective bargaining. Because of this substantial diﬀerence in the bargaining process, we have
excluded from our sample all contracts negotiated under the Railway Labor Act. See Herbert
R. Northrup (1971) for a detailed discussion of the Railway Labor Act.
5 The exception is Tracy (1988), in which the stockmarket response to settlements, strikes,
and holdouts is analyzed. The deﬁnition of holdout used in that paper was more restricted in
that holdouts followed by a strike were treated simply as a strike.
6 Our data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Current Wage Developments, Current
Work Stopages, and Industrial Relations Facts) and the Bureau of National Aﬀairs (Collective
Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts). See Sheena McConnell (1989) and Tracy (1986) for
a detailed description.
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Table 1: Dispute Incidence And Duration By Industry
Median [mean] duration (days)
Holdout
Strikea
Strikeb
Dispute
32
27
53
37
[63]
[43]
[76]
[65]
Manufacturing,
1408
47
7
54
30
27
64
34
durable
[62]
[48]
[88]
[65]
Manufacturing,
1431
33
18
51
18
30
48
28
nondurable
[57]
[46]
[72]
[62]
Transportation
175
59
14
73
60
13
72
60
[86]
[20]
[109]
[90]
Communication
226
50
8
58
39
47
64
41
[56]
[47]
[88]
[61]
Utilities
532
37
6
43
48
42
70
60
[77]
[62]
[82]
[90]
Retail Trade
809
66
7
73
40
17
50
40
[59]
[26]
[56]
[59]
Services
421
65
8
72
32
20
46
34
[68]
[26]
[67]
[68]
Notes: Holdout means the contract was signed without a strike more than one day after the contract
expiration. Strike means a strike occured before the contract was signed. Dispute means either a holdout
or a strike occured before the contract was signed.
a Days from the beginning of the strike to the end of the strike
b Days from the contract expiration to the end of the strike
Industry
Overall

Contracts
5002

Incidence (percentage)
Holdout
Strike Dispute
47
10
57

incidence is 47 percent. The incidence of disputes ranges across industries from
a high of 73 percent in transportation to a low of 43 percent in utilities.
A useful measure of how rapidly disputes are settled over time is the settlement rate from dispute, deﬁned as the conditional probability (frequency) of
moving from a state of dispute to a state of settlement, given that the dispute
has lasted a particular duration. Figure 1 shows the empirical settlement rate
from dispute plotted against the number of days relative to the previous contract’s expiration date. A clear “deadline eﬀect” exists in the data.7 Ignoring
contracts that are renegotiated and made eﬀective before contract expiration,
only 12 percent settle before the contract expiration. The daily settlement rate
on the expiration date and the following day are 15 percent and 24 percent,
respectively. Over the next six days, the daily settlement rate falls from around
4 percent to about 2 percent. Figure 2 shows the weekly settlement rates from
a dispute and from a strike over the ﬁrst 100 days following contract expiration.
After the ﬁrst week, the weekly settlement rate from dispute is roughly constant
at 11 percent.
Strikes account for only 18 percent of all disputed settlements (Table 1). A
majority of strikes begin almost immediately following the contract expiration.
Of the disputes that involve a strike, 50 percent begin within two days after
the contract expiration, and 61 percent begin within a week after the contract
expiration. By two months following the expiration date, 89 percent of the
7 See Alvin E. Roth et al. (1988) for a discussion of the deadline eﬀect in experimental
work.
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Figure 1: Daily Settlement Rate Around Expiration.

Figure 2: Weekly Settlement Rates.

overall sample of strikes have started. Strike incidence, though, remains high
as the length of holdout increases. The conditional strike incidence is roughly
constant at 8 percent.
The median and mean dispute durations are also given in Table 1. For contracts that have not settled by the day following the expiration date, the median
(mean) dispute duration is 37 (65) days. The median (mean) holdout duration
is 32 (63) days. The median (mean) strike duration is 27 (43) days. Including
the holdout before the beginning of the strike brings the median (mean) dispute
duration for strikes to 53 (76) days. Interestingly, the median holdout duration
is roughly the same as the median strike duration.
Table 2 illustrates the incidence and duration of disputes across diﬀerent
years in our sample. An important feature of this table is that the dispute
incidence has a much smaller variance across years than the strike incidence.
The primary determinant of the variation in the strike incidence across years in
our sample is not variation in the overall dispute incidence; rather, it is variation
in the composition of disputes between holdouts and strikes.
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Table 2: Dispute Incidence And Duration By Year
Incidence (percentage)
Median [mean] duration (days)
Year
Contracts Holdout
Strike Dispute
Holdout
Strikea
Strikeb
Dispute
1970
19
32
21
53
103
37
103
103
1971
152
36
13
49
95
33
129
104
1972
115
46
9
55
94
12
81
92
1973
238
37
12
49
48
20
62
51
1974
324
42
14
56
26
24
37
29
1975
244
41
9
49
23
47
52
28
1976
279
42
16
57
21
29
60
32
1977
362
37
11
49
38
35
50
41
1978
211
39
16
55
22
29
49
30
1979
278
36
13
49
42
33
51
44
1980
349
35
8
43
19
26
68
29
1981
223
45
8
53
23
19
39
26
1982
279
46
7
53
30
26
39
31
1983
362
52
8
60
35
42
65
39
1984
266
52
10
62
28
16
46
31
1985
258
56
11
67
36
24
46
38
1986
317
58
13
71
27
27
43
30
1987
221
67
8
75
41
15
40
41
1988
238
65
9
74
24
31
84
31
1989
249
65
4
69
36
38
52
37
1970-1979
2222
39
13
52
37
29
57
42
1980-1989
2780
53
9
62
30
26
50
33
1970-1989
5002
47
10
57
32
27
53
37
Notes: Holdout means the contract was signed without a strike more than one day after the contract
expiration. Strike means a strike occurred before the contract was signed. Dispute means either a holdout
or a strike occurred before the contract was signed.
a Days from the beginning of the strike to the end of the strike
b Days from the contract expiration to the end of the strike
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A Model of Wage Bargaining

A union and a ﬁrm are bargaining over the wage to be paid during a contract
of duration T . For simplicity, we assume that only a single new contract is negotiated.8 The union’s reservation wage is common knowledge. The reservation
wage is what the worker receives during a strike. If the worker is able to secure temporary employment during the strike, then the reservation wage is the
nonunion wage; otherwise, the reservation wage is determined by the worker’s
access to unemployment insurance (UI), welfare, or other strike beneﬁts. Let v
be the ﬁrm’s value of the current labor force working under a contract of duration T . It is common knowledge that v is drawn from the distribution F with
positive density f on an interval support [l, h] . However, the realized value of v
is known only to the ﬁrm.
The game begins with the union selecting a threat θ ∈ {H, S}, either holdout
or strike, which applies until a settlement is reached.9 In the threat θ, the
payoﬀ to the union is xθ , and the payoﬀ to the ﬁrm is yθ (v). Only the ﬁrm’s
threat payoﬀ may depend on the value v.10 We consider a linear threat model:
8 This assumption is problematic for the following reason. We show that the wage from the
old contract plays an important role in the current contract negotiation; but this implies that
the wage negotiated for this contract will be important in the next contract negotiation. By
looking at a single contract negotiation, our analysis is incomplete in that we are ignoring the
eﬀect today’s wage bargain has on future negotiations. Although extending the analysis to
allow for a sequence of contracts is important, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Cramton
and Tracy (1991a) provides a brief analysis of the game with a sequence of contracts. That
study identiﬁes particular settings in which the analysis with a sequence of contracts is the
same as the single-contract analysis presented here. Holden (1990a) also has made progress
along these lines in a model with full information. He shows that wage bargaining can lead
to inﬂation, as workers can obtain nominal wage increases by threatening to hold out.
9 The model presented here does not allow the ﬁrm to lock out the union. This restriction
would be problematic if lockouts were frequently observed in the U.S. contract data, but they
are not (only 3 percent of work stoppages are lockouts). One explanation for the absence of
lockouts is that they may be very costly for the ﬁrm. For example, a lockout can expose the
ﬁrm to a substantial liability if there is a ruling by the National Labor Relations Board that
the ﬁrm committed an unfair labor practice. Also, in 21 states, workers collect UI beneﬁts in
the event of a lockout (Robert Hutchens et al., 1989). To the extent that UI programs are
experience-rated, lockouts in the these states result in workers getting paid by the ﬁrm (at
least partially), but production does not occur. Another explanation, which is outside our
model, is that a lockout by the ﬁrm might reduce subsequent productivity by damaging ﬁrmworker relations. This explanation rests on an asymmetry in the employment relationship:
the workers rely on the ﬁrm for their pay, which is easy to contract on, but the ﬁrm relies on
the workers’ cooperation in production, which is diﬃcult to contract on. In this case, there
may be long-term costs associated with a lockout, which reduce its desirability for the ﬁrm
(Holden, 1990b).
10 Firms sometimes backdate wage settlements to the contract expiration if a strike is not
called. Since xθ does not depend on v it may appear that we do not allow backdating.
However, we can interpret backdating as a lump-sum payment to the workers, which can be
amortized over the remaining life of the contract to form a correspondingly higher settlement
wage. With this interpretation, incidence and duration are not biased by backdating, but the
observed wages would be too low as a result of backdating. Backdating may be an important
issue in a model with a sequence of contracts to the extent it can be used by the ﬁrm to lower
the settlement wage from what it would be without backdating
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yθ (v) = aθ v−bθ , where aθ ∈ [0, 1) and bθ ≥ 0. The term 1−aθ , which we call the
dispute cost, measures how far the parties are from the Pareto frontier during
the threat θ. We deﬁne cθ = (bθ − xθ ) / (1 − aθ ) to be the relative payment
diﬀerence during the threat θ: what the ﬁrm pays less what the union gets
divided by the dispute cost. Since the total payoﬀ in agreement is v and the
total payoﬀ in the threat is aθ v − bθ + xθ , the pie that the parties are bargaining
over is (1 − aθ ) v + bθ − xθ = (1 − aθ ) (v + cθ ). We assume that this pie is
positive for all v ∈ [l, h], which implies cθ > −l.
For now, we will not be more speciﬁc about the strike threat (xs , as v − bs ).
The advantage of analyzing general strike threats is that we can say how the bargaining outcome changes as the strike threat varies due to changes in economic
or policy variables.
The holdout threat, however, can be further speciﬁed. Let w0 be the current
wage, that is, the wage under the expired contract. By law the workers are
paid the current wage w0 during a holdout, so bH = xH = w0 and cH = 0.
Presumably, the ﬁrm could unilaterally raise the holdout wage, but later we
provide an explanation for why it would not want to do so. We assume that
there is some ineﬃciency associated with a holdout: aH < 1. There are three
motivations for this ineﬃciency. First, during a holdout the workers have an
incentive to slow down or “work to rule”; that is, to work exactly according
to the rules of the expired contract and no more. When the ﬁrm must rely
on the cooperation of the work force for eﬃcient production, this may be an
important source of ineﬃciency in the holdout threat. Second, one issue in the
negotiation may be changes in the work rules that will increase productivity.
This is consistent with our model if we assume that the changes will increase
the value added by the work force by a ﬁxed factor (from aH v to v). Third,
because of the disruption that a potential strike might cause, some of the ﬁrm’s
customers and suppliers may be reluctant to deal with the ﬁrm during a holdout.
The precise value of aH is not important for many of our empirical ﬁndings. In
particular, we will show that dispute incidence and dispute duration do not
depend on aH , so long as aH < 1.
An outcome of the game, denoted t, w, θ, speciﬁes the time of agreement,
t ∈ [0, T ], the contract wage w at the time of agreement, and the threat θ ∈
{H, S} before agreement. The players’ payoﬀs are calculated as a combination
of the threat payoﬀ and the agreement payoﬀ, weighted by the fraction of time
spent in dispute, as shown in Figure 3. We are assuming, then, that the players
are risk-neutral and that the payoﬀ ﬂows, both during the threat and after
agreement, are constant over time.11 Deﬁne
1 − e−rt
1 − e−rT
to be the discounted fraction of time spent in dispute if agreement occurs at
time t, where r > 0 is the discount rate. Then, given the outcome t, w, θ, the
union’s payoﬀ is
D(t) =

11 Cramton

and Tracy (1991b) extends the model to nonstationary threat payoﬀs.
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Figure 3: Payoﬀs From Bargaining Outcome.

U (t, w, θ) = xθ D(t) + w [1 − D(t)]
and the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is
V (t, w, θ) = yθ (v)D(t) + (v − w)[1 − D(t)]
Following the choice of threat, the players alternate making wage oﬀers with
a minimum time t0 between oﬀers. Associated with each period of disagreement,
0
then, is the discount factor δ = e−rt . The union makes the initial oﬀer one
period before contract expiration (at time −t0 ). After an oﬀer is made, the
other player has two possible responses: (i) a counteroﬀer, in which case the
game continues, or (ii) acceptance, in which case the game ends with trade
occurring at the oﬀered wage for the remainder of the contracting period T. As
in Anat R. Admati and Motty Perry (1987), the response can occur at any time
after the minimum time t 0 between oﬀers.12 Suppose that in round i the oﬀer
wi is made after a wait ∆i beyond the minimum time t0 between oﬀers. Then,
after n rounds of play, the history ρn is given by {θ, ∆i , wi }i=1,...,n . Throughout
the paper, when we refer to an oﬀer being accepted or a counteroﬀer being made
immediately, we mean that the action is taken with no additional wait beyond
the minimum time between oﬀers (i.e., ∆i = 0).
12 This assumption leads to the outcome in which a ﬁrm signals its private information
through the dispute duration (Admati and Perry, 1987; Cramton, 1991, 1992). It has been
criticized on the grounds that it enables each bargainer to commit to not revising an oﬀer
until a counteroﬀer is made. In particular, if the ﬁrm rejects the union’s initial oﬀer, the union
has an incentive to lower its oﬀer, assuming the ﬁrm’s strategy is stationary (i.e., the ﬁrm’s
willingness to accept a particular price is not inﬂuenced by the union’s revision). If, however,
we allow nonstationary strategies, then the signaling outcome can be approximated as a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in the alternating-oﬀer game with a ﬁxed time between oﬀers when the
time between oﬀers is small (Lawrence M. Ausubel and Raymond J. Deneckere, 1991). We
have chosen this extensive form, despite its shortcomings, because of its relative simplicity
and because it has an equilibrium with sensible qualitative properties
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A pure strategy σu for the union speciﬁes a threat choice and, after each
history ρn at which it is the union’s turn to move, a wait ∆n+1 , and whether
to accept wn or make a counteroﬀer wn+1 . Similarly, deﬁne σv to be a pure
strategy for the ﬁrm with a valuation v, and let σ = {σu, σv ∀v ∈ [l, h]} be
a strategy proﬁle for the players. (Only pure strategies are considered.) The
strategies σ result in an outcome t, w, θ, which depends on the ﬁrm’s valuation
v. Let F (· |ρn ) denote the union’s belief about the ﬁrm’s valuation after the
history ρn .
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this game is the collection {σ (ρn ) , F (· |ρn )}ρn
of strategies and beliefs, such that after every history ρn each player’s strategy
is optimal given his current beliefs and the other’s strategy and the beliefs are
consistent with Bayes’s rule.
We assume that the minimum time between oﬀers t0 is arbitrarily small.
This is the interesting case, since in practice one observes a minimum time
between oﬀers that is small relative to plausible discount rates. Moreover, it
can be shown that under full information each bargainer has an incentive to
respond as quickly as possible to the other’s oﬀer. All the formulas change
continuously as the minimum time between oﬀers shrinks to zero and indeed
are insensitive to changes in the time between oﬀers. Hence, the limiting results
as t0 → 0 closely approximate the results with small t0 . The formulas when
δ < 1 are easily calculated but are omitted for brevity.
The equilibrium takes a simple form. If w0 is suﬃciently low (below a cutoﬀ
level w),
 the union decides to strike; otherwise (w0 ≥ w̃), the union decides to
hold out. The cutoﬀ level w̃ depends on r, T, F , and the threat payoﬀs (xθ , yθ )
for θ ∈ {H, S}. A second cutoﬀ level m ∈ (l, h) is determined by the union’s
initial oﬀer. The ﬁrm accepts the union’s initial oﬀer if its valuation is above m
and otherwise rejects the oﬀer.
The equilibrium is constructed by ﬁrst looking at the subform after a threat
θ ∈ {H, S} is chosen.
Proposition 1. Let θ = (xθ , yθ ) be the threat chosen by the union, where
yθ = aθ v − bθ and cθ = (bθ − xθ ) / (1 − aθ ). In the limit as the time between
oﬀers goes to zero, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the following
form:
(i) The union makes an immediate oﬀer of w(m) = xθ + 12 (1 − aθ ) (m + cθ ),
where m (cθ ) ∈ (l, h) maximizes

(m + cθ ) [1 − F (m)] +
l

m

2

(v + cθ )
dF (v)
m + cθ

(1)

(ii) The ﬁrm accepts the oﬀer if v ≥ m. Otherwise, if v < m, the ﬁrm waits
until (m − v) /(m + cθ ) of the contract period has passed before oﬀering
wθ (v) = xθ + 12 (1 − aθ ) (v + cθ ), which is accepted immediately by the
union.
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(iii) The union’s expected payoﬀ from the threat θ is Uθ , the ﬁrm’s expected
payoﬀ is Vθ , and the expected loss is Lθ , where
Uθ = xθ + (1 − aθ )(m + cθ ) [1 − F (m)]

Vθ = aθ E(v) − bθ + (1 − aθ )

h

(v + cθ ) dF (v)
m



Lθ = (1 − aθ ) cθ − (m + 2cθ ) [1 − F (m)] +

m


vdF (v)

l

Proof: For simplicity, only the equilibrium path is derived here; see Cramton
and Tracy (1991a) for details. The wage wθ (v) = xθ + 12 (1 − aθ ) (v + cθ ), is the
Rubinstein (1982) wage in the complete-information game between the union
and a ﬁrm with valuation v in the limit as the time between oﬀers goes to zero.
The fact that only Rubinstein oﬀers are made follows from arguments presented
in Admati and Perry (1987). Suppose that the union makes the initial oﬀer
wθ (m). This is acceptable to a ﬁrm with v ∈ [m, h]. Then a ﬁrm with v ∈ [l, m)
waits long enough to signal its type (see Cramton and Tracy, 1991a). Hence,
the type of ﬁrm v(t) that makes an oﬀer at time t must satisfy the following
incentive condition:
yθ (v)D(t) + {v − wθ [v(t)]} [1 − D(t)]
= max (yθ (v)D(τ )) + {v − wθ [v(τ )]} [1 − D(τ )]
τ

Taking the derivative with respect to τ yields the ﬁrst-order condition


r {v − wθ [v(t)] − yθ (v)} + wθ [v (t)] 1 − e−r(T −t) = 0
where
yθ (v) = aθ v − bθ
wθ [v(t)] = xθ + 12 (1 − aθ ) (v + cθ )
v − wθ [v(t)] − yθ (v) = 12 (1 − aθ ) (v + cθ )
w = 12 (1 − aθ ) v  .
Hence, the ﬁrst-order condition becomes


r (v + cθ ) + v  1 − e−r(T −t) = 0.
This is a separable ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equation with initial condition v(0) =
m, which by integration has the unique solution
v (t) = (m + cθ ) [1 − D(t)] − cθ
Solving for D(·) and restating in terms of v, yields
D(v) = (m − v)/(m + cθ )
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for v ∈ [l, m]. Notice that the duration of the dispute as given above only
depends on the threat (xθ , yθ ) through the relative payment diﬀerence cθ =
(bθ − xθ ) /(1 − aθ ).
It remains to determine the union’s initial oﬀer wθ (m) = xθ + 12 (1 − aθ ) (m + cθ ).
The union selects wθ (m) (i.e., selects m) to maximize its expected payoﬀ. Since
the ﬁrm accepts wθ (m) if v ∈ [m, h], the union gets wθ (m) with probability
1 − F (m). Otherwise, the ﬁrm rejects the oﬀer, and agreement occurs at the
wage wθ (v) = xθ + 12 (1 − aθ ) (v + cθ ) after payoﬀs have been discounted by
1 − D(v) = (v + cθ )/(m + cθ ), resulting in a discounted ex post payoﬀ of
xθ +

1
(v + cθ )2
(1 − aθ )
.
2
m + cθ

Taking the expectation with respect to v results in the union’s expected payoﬀ


 m
(v + cθ )2
1
U (m) = xθ + (1 − aθ ) (m + cθ ) [1 − F (m)] +
dF (v)
2
m + cθ
l
Taking the derivative with respect to m yields the ﬁrst-order condition
 m
2
v + cθ
1 − F (m) −
dF (v) = 0
m + cθ
l

(2)

Since U  (l) > 0, U  (h) < 0, and U (·) is continuous in m, an interior maximum is
guaranteed, and the ﬁrst-order condition (2) must be satisﬁed at the maximum.
Hence, we can substitute (2) into the formula for the union’s expected payoﬀ to
yield Uθ = xθ + (1 − aθ )(m + cθ )[1 − F (m)]. The ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ and the
expected loss are calculated similarly.
The holdout cost (1 − aH ) is exogenous in our model; but a main motivation
for aH < 1 is that the workers choose to slow down production during a holdout.
How much should the workers slow down? As much as possible. This follows
from Proposition 1. The union’s expected payoﬀ from a holdout is UH = w0 +
(1 − aH )m[1 − F (m)], since the ﬁrm pays the workers w0 during a holdout.
Hence, the union’s expected payoﬀ increases linearly in the holdout cost 1 − aH .
The union’s bargaining power during a holdout stems solely from its ability to
reduce eﬃciency. In practice, two things constrain the union’s ability to disrupt
production. One is the expired contract, which still applies during a holdout.
The workers have an incentive to slow down as much as possible but must stay
within the rules of the contract to avoid being cited for an unfair labor practice.
This gives meaning to the expression “work to rule.” A second constraining
force on the union is the threat of a lockout by the ﬁrm if the union disrupts
production too much.
Our next proposition states a comparative-static result about how dispute
incidence and dispute duration change with changes in the threat θ = (xθ , yθ ) or
the distribution of v. This comparative static is important for empirical work,
since it leads to testable predictions about how dispute incidence and dispute
duration vary with economic or policy changes.
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Proposition 2. Suppose that m(cθ ) uniquely maximizes (1). Dispute incidence
F (m(cθ )) and dispute duration D(v, cθ ) = [m(cθ ) − v]/[m(cθ ) + cθ ] decrease as
cθ increases or as the distribution of v shifts to the right.
Proof: Dispute incidence F (m(cθ )) decreases as cθ increases if and only if
dm/dcθ < 0. To show this, consider the ﬁrst-order condition


m

1 − F (m) =
l

v + cθ
m + cθ

2

dF (v)

which must be satisﬁed at the interior maximum. Taking the derivative with
respect to cθ and solving for dm/dcθ yields


m (v+cθ )(v−m)
f (v)
(m+cθ )3
f (m) dv
l
dm


=
m (v+cθ )2
f (v)
dcθ
dv
1−
3
(m+cθ )

l

f (m)

However, the second-order condition, which is a strict inequality since m(cθ ) is
the unique maximizer, is
 m
(v + cθ )2 f (v)
dv < 1
(m + cθ )3 f (m)
l
Hence, the denominator in the expression for dm/dcθ is positive, and the numerator is negative (recall cθ > −l), so dm/dcθ < 0. To show that dispute
duration also decreases, take the derivative of D(v, cθ ) with respect to cθ :
dD
=
dcθ

dm
dcθ (v

+ cθ ) + (v − m)
(m + cθ )2

<0

where the inequality follows because both terms in the numerator are negative.
Now consider an outward shift of s > 0 in the distribution F . Then ﬁrm
value v  = v+s is drawn from the distribution G with G(v + s) = F (v). The
union chooses m to satisfy the ﬁrst-order condition
1 − G(m ) =



m

l+s

v  + cθ
m + cθ

2

dG(v  ).

Equivalently, the union can choose m = m to satisfy

1 − F (m) =
l

m

v + s + cθ
m + s + cθ

2

dF (v)

and make an initial oﬀer of wθ (m + s). Hence, an outward shift of the distribution has the same eﬀect as an increase in cθ : dispute incidence and dispute
duration decrease.
The appropriate notion of uncertainty in this bargaining problem is the
standard deviation of the pie the parties are bargaining over relative to the
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expected size of the pie. An increase in cθ , as a result of a change in the threat,
has the eﬀect of shifting the distribution of v to the right when we normalize
the bargaining problem so that the threat is at (0, 0). Hence, an increase in
cθ or an outward shift in the distribution of v has the eﬀect of reducing the
level of uncertainty. With this interpretation, Proposition 2 is intuitive. A
reduction in the level of uncertainty decreases dispute incidence and dispute
duration. Dispute incidence, however, always exceeds 12 and converges to 12 in
the limit as uncertainty vanishes. This follows from the ﬁrst-order condition
(2), which represents the union’s trade-oﬀ between postponed agreement and a
higher expected wage.13
In what follows, we assume that the strike threat is such that the wage payment made by the ﬁrm is equal to the amount received by the workers.
ASSUMPTION S:
bS = xS .
This is a reasonable assumption in many cases: (i) production stops and workers are not paid, (ii) production stops and workers are paid UI beneﬁts that
are ﬁnanced by the ﬁrm through higher UI taxes, and (iii) strikers ﬁnd temporary jobs that pay the nonunion wage and production continues at reduced
eﬃciency with replacement workers paid the nonunion wage. Surprisingly, under Assumption S, both dispute incidence and dispute duration are invariant
to the threat chosen. Even when strike costs are 100 times larger than holdout
costs, information is signaled as quickly through a holdout as through a strike.
This result is stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption S, the dispute incidence F (m) and dispute
duration D(v, m) are the same, regardless of the threat chosen by the union, and
do not depend on the current wage or the dispute cost. In particular, D(v, m) =
1 − v/m, where m maximizes (1) Moreover, the equilibrium wage falls during
the dispute at a rate that is proportional to the dispute cost 1 − aθ .
Proof: Assumption S implies that with either threat cθ = 0. Since D(v, m)
only depends on the threat θ = (xθ , yθ ) through cθ , both threats have the
same dispute duration. Similarly, since m(cθ ) only depends on the threat
through cθ , the dispute incidence F (m) is the same with either threat. Finally,
w (t) = 12 (1 − aθ )v  (t) = − 12 (1 − aθ )mD (t). Thus, since D(t) is independent of
θ, wages decline at a rate that is proportional to the dispute cost 1 − aθ .
Proposition 3 may seem counterintuitive based on the following reasoning.
Bargaining costs are borne for the ﬁrm to signal its proﬁtability. The total cost
13 When the data are disaggregated to the industry level, dispute incidence is sometimes
below 50 percent, which is inconsistent with a strict interpretation of our model. If, however,
there is a positive ﬁxed cost of initiating a dispute, then dispute incidence would be zero for
cases with little uncertainty. This could lead to an aggregate dispute incidence of less than
50 percent.
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that must be incurred to signal a given level of proﬁtability should not depend
on the rate at which costs are incurred. Hence, the dispute duration should
be inversely proportional to the dispute cost, to make the total dispute cost
invariant to the rate at which costs are incurred.
We consider this intuition to represent one reason why holdouts have received
little attention in the literature on wage bargaining. Based on this reasoning,
one might argue that, since holdout costs are small relative to strike costs, the
role of holdouts in contract negotiations should be insigniﬁcant. This intuition,
however, is wrong.
The key to the correct intuition is recognizing that equilibrium wages fall at
a rate that is proportional to the dispute cost: w (t) = 12 (1 − aθ )v  (t). The rate
v  (t) at which ﬁrms signal themselves is determined from an incentive constraint,
which requires a ﬁrm to wait until the marginal beneﬁt of postponed agreement
is equal to the marginal cost. The marginal beneﬁt is the improved terms of
agreement (lower wages), and the marginal cost is the loss from waiting. Both
the marginal beneﬁt and the marginal cost of waiting increase linearly with the
dispute cost 1 − aθ . Increasing the dispute cost by a factor of 100 increases the
costs of waiting by a factor of 100 but also increases the beneﬁts of waiting by
the same factor. Hence, both sides of the trade-oﬀ equation change in lockstep,
and the rate at which ﬁrms signal themselves is invariant to the rate at which
dispute costs are incurred.
Essential to the invariance result is our “linear threat” assumption: that the
value of the work force during a dispute is aθ v, where aθ does not depend on v.
With this assumption, the optimization problem for ﬁrm v is the same under
either threat. The bargaining problem under a holdout is simply a rescaling
of the bargaining problem under a strike. With the threat θ, t is chosen to
maximize
1
(aθ v − xθ )D(T t) + v − xθ − (1 − aθ )v(t) [1 − D(t)]
2
since wθ [v(t)] = xθ − 12 (1 − aθ )v(t). Ignoring terms that do not depend on t
yields


1
−(1 − aθ ) vD(T t) + v(t) [1 − D(t)]
2
Thus, the optimal wait t(v) for ﬁrm v is the same under either threat.
It is possible for wages to fall below w0 after a long strike if w0 > xS + 12 (1 −
aS )l. This is reasonable, since after an impasse the terms of the expired contract
are no longer binding on the ﬁrm when the workers return. Thus, the union
cannot switch from strike to holdout and be assured a wage of w0 . In practice,
wages sometimes fall below w0 even without a strike. This may happen during
concessionary bargaining as a result of a threat by the ﬁrm to lay oﬀ part of the
work force if concessions are not made. Our model ignores this possibility.
Proposition 3 implies that the total bargaining costs are proportional to
how far the threat point is from the Pareto frontier. Assuming aS < aH , total
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Figure 4: The Ex Post Outcomes For Strike Threat And Holdout Threat.

bargaining costs are higher if the strike threat is chosen, rather than the holdout
threat.
The intuition for which threat is chosen is now straightforward. The union
decides to strike if the higher bargaining costs associated with a strike are compensated for by a higher wage if the strike threat is chosen. This is illustrated
in Figure 4, which shows the ex post outcome for both threats. If the strike
threat (S) is chosen, then settlement occurs at the wage wS (v); if the holdout
threat (H) is chosen, then settlement occurs at the wage wH (v), which is less
than wS (v) due to the low current wage. The union decides to strike if and only
if the current wage is below the cutoﬀ w̃, so that the expected wage under the
strike threat is suﬃciently greater than the expected wage under the holdout
threat to make up for the higher bargaining costs associated with a strike.
Proposition 4. Under Assumption S, if w0 < w̃ , the union chooses to strike;
if w0 ≥ w̃, the union chooses to hold out, where w̃ = xS + (aH − aS )m[1 − F (m)]
and m maximizes (1).
Proof: From Proposition 1, the expected payoﬀ to the union given the threat
θ is
Uθ = xθ + (1 − aθ )(m + cθ )[1 − F (m)]
where m maximizes (1). Since cθ = 0 by Assumption S, the union prefers strike
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over holdout if and only if US > UH , or w0 < xS + (aH − aS )m[1 − F (m)].
The model oﬀers new insights into the determinants of strike activity. The
overall incidence of strikes depends on both the incidence of disputes and the
fraction of disputes that involve a strike. The level of dispute activity depends
on the amount of uncertainty. The composition of disputes between holdouts
and strikes depends on w0 and the location of the support of the distribution
of v. Table 2 suggests that most of the variation in strike activity across years
is due to changes in the composition of dispute activity, rather than to changes
in the level of dispute activity. The model predicts that the composition of
disputes will shift toward more strikes in the following situations: (i) after a
period of uncompensated inﬂation, which causes a drop in w0 in real terms,
(ii) after a decline in the local unemployment rate, which increases the workers’
reservation wage in the strike threat, and (iii) after an increase in the ﬁrm’s
demand, which improves proﬁtability by shifting the distribution of v outward.
These predictions about strike activity are consistent with several empirical ﬁndings based on U.S. and Canadian negotiations. A robust ﬁnding in
the literature is that the incidence of strikes decreases with the degree of real
wage growth over the period of the last contract. This relationship has been
demonstrated by Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969), Cynthia L. Gramm (1986),
Martin J. Mauro (1982), and Susan B. Vroman (1989) using U.S. data, and
by Morley Gunderson et al. (1986) using Canadian data. In a related ﬁnding,
McConnell (1989) and Vroman (1989) show that the probability of a strike is
positively related to the amount of uncompensated inﬂation over the previous
contract. The role played by local labor-market conditions is consistent with
ﬁndings that strike incidence in the United States is an increasing function of
both trend growth in local employment and positive deviations about this trend
(Tracy, 1986). Finally, the model oﬀers an explanation for why strike incidence
may be procyclic (Alan Harrison and Mark Stewart, 1989a,b; Kennan, 1986).
In expansions, strike incidence increases due to the upward shift in v, while the
current wage is ﬁxed at w0 .

2.1

An Example with Uniform Uncertainty

We now turn to an example in which the uncertainty about the ﬁrm’s profitability is given by the uniform distribution on [l, h]. Our purpose is to show
that it is possible for the model to reproduce the key features of the data when
we make plausible assumptions about the model’s parameters.14 We use the
uniform distribution, since in this case the equilibrium can be derived in closed
form. Numerical calculations with other distributions, such as a truncated normal distribution, suggest that our distributional assumption is not crucial to
the results.
14 A more detailed comparison of the model and empirical results is presented in Cramton
and Tracy (1991a).
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Proposition 5. In the equilibrium with uniform uncertainty under assumption
S, the union selects the strike threat if w0 ≤ w̃ , where
w̃ = xS + (aH − aS )m
m(l, h) =

h−m
h−l

1
[k + h(1 + h/k)]
4

 13
 
k = 4 l3 (h3 + 4l3 ) + h3 + 8l3
The union’s initial oﬀer wθ (m) is accepted by the ﬁrm if v ≥ m and otherwise
rejected.
Proof: With the uniform distribution, expression (1) in Proposition 1 is a
strictly concave function in m, so the unique maximizer of (1) is given by the
ﬁrst-order condition (2). Substituting into (2) yields
 m 2
v
dv
h−m=
m2
l
since cθ = 0 by Assumption S. Simplifying this expression yields the cubic
equation
3hm2 − 4m3 + l3 = 0
which has a single real solution given in the proposition. The threat decision
then follows from Proposition 4, and the initial oﬀer follows from Proposition
1.
Once m is determined it is a simple matter to calculate other features of
the equilibrium (see the Appendix for details) and to show how the bargaining
outcome changes as we vary the parameters of the model. We assume that v is
uniform on [l, 2 − l], so that v has a mean of 1 and a variance of (1 − l)2 /3 Thus,
by varying l, we can vary the level of uncertainty without changing the mean of
the distribution. In particular, the standard deviation increases linearly from
0 as 1 − l increases from 0. We refer to 1 − l as the level of uncertainty for
l ∈ [0, 1]. For calculations that depend on r and T , we assume an interest rate
of 10 percent and a contract length of 2.7 years, the mean contract length in
our sample.
One critical parameter that cannot be estimated directly from the data is
the level of uncertainty 1 − l . It is important, therefore, to look at how the
bargaining outcome changes with the level of uncertainty. Figure 5 shows the
dispute incidence and dispute duration as the level of uncertainty increases
from 0. A remarkable feature of this model is that the incidence and duration
depend only on l and not on the choice of threat or any other parameters of
the model. The dispute incidence increases from 12 to 34 as we move from little
uncertainty to maximal uncertainty. The dispute duration is measured as the
fraction of the contract period spent in dispute conditional on a dispute. This

Cramton and Tracy

A Model of Wage Bargaining

19

Figure 5: Dispute Incidence And Duration.

fraction is zero with no uncertainty, and it increases to just over 0.5 as the
uncertainty increases to 1. With l = 0.93, the incidence of dispute is 52 percent,
and the average dispute duration is 32 days (assuming that contracts last 2.7
years), compared with an empirical incidence of 57 percent and duration of 37
days. The fact that both incidence and duration roughly ﬁt the data when
l = 0.93 lends support to the model, since l is the only free parameter. A strike
incidence of 10 percent would result if the distribution of w0 were such that
20 percent of the unions prefer the strike threat (the corresponding holdout
incidence would be 41 percent). This is in rough agreement with the empirical
strike and holdout incidences of 10 percent and 47 percent. Finally, the strike
and holdout durations would both be 32 days, compared with an empirical strike
duration of 27 days and a holdout duration of 32 days.
For a given bargaining pair, the settlement rate increases with time. Hence,
to explain the ﬂat settlement rate observed in the data, we must introduce heterogeneity about the degree of uncertainty. In particular, assume that there are
26 equally sized subpopulations of ﬁrms, where l = 0.75 for the ﬁrst subpopulation, l = 0.76 for the second, and on up to l = 1 for the last. Figure 6 shows
the aggregate weekly settlement rate from dispute over the ﬁrst 100 days of the
dispute for this case. This range of uncertainty yields an aggregate settlement
rate (the solid line in the ﬁgure) that is roughly consistent with the empirical
settlement rate (the dashed line).
As seen in Figure 2, the empirical settlement rate during a strike is slightly
higher than the settlement rate during a holdout. This would occur in our
model if there is heterogeneity about the degree of uncertainty. As uncertainty
increases, the strike threat becomes less attractive relative to the holdout threat,
due to the large bargaining costs associated with a strike. With more uncertainty, then, the union is more apt to choose the holdout threat. The union’s
threat choice thus leads to a selection bias in which observed strikes should on
average involve less uncertainty and have higher settlement rates than observed
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Figure 6: Weekly Settlement Rate From Dispute.

holdouts.
To make predictions about wages and payoﬀs, we must specify particular
threat parameters. We use parameter values that are consistent with a union
wage diﬀerential of 14 percent (H. Gregory Lewis, 1986). In particular, we
assume that, during a strike, the workers get temporary jobs at the nonunion
wage, and the ﬁrm employs replacement workers at the nonunion wage. In this
case, the 14-percent union wage diﬀerential implies a decline in productivity
during a strike of about 25 percent (aS = 75 percent). Further, we assume that
the current wage splits the expected ﬁrm value about equally between the union
and the ﬁrm. Since the expected value is 1, we use w0 = 0.43 with xS about
14 percent less (xS = 0.35). Finally, assume that the decline in productivity
during a holdout is 6 percent (aH = 94 percent).
Figure 7 shows the average decline in wages during a dispute. The rate at
which wages fall depends on the threat chosen by the union. Under the strike
threat, the percentage decline in wages per 100 days of strike is 3.0 percent
and increases slightly with uncertainty. Under the holdout threat, the decline
in wages is roughly one-third of the decline under a strike. Hence, the model
predicts that we should observe a larger decline in wages during a strike than
during a holdout. The predicted decline in wages during a strike (3.0 percent
with l = 0.93) is consistent with McConnell (1989) using U.S. data, but inconsistent with David Card (1990), who found no decline in wages using Canadian
data.
Now consider how the ex ante allocation of the gains from trade varies with
the current wage. In the strike threat, the current wage does not aﬀect the bargaining outcome. In the holdout threat, the union’s share of the gains increases
linearly with w0 . The ﬁrm, then, has an incentive to maintain a low current
wage. This implication of the model provides an explanation for why the ﬁrm
might oﬀer retroactive wage increases or lump-sum payments. These forms of
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Figure 7: Average Wage Decline During Dispute.

compensation enable the ﬁrm to oﬀer the union the same total payoﬀ while
maintaining a lower base wage. The lower wage reduces the union’s advantage
in the next contract negotiation.
Figure 8 shows the ex ante allocation of the gains from trade as we vary the
union’s uncertainty about the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability. For low levels of uncertainty,
w̃ > w0 = 0.50, and so the union chooses the strike threat. As the uncertainty
increases, the losses associated with a strike increase, but the split of the remaining gains is roughly constant at 46 percent for the union and 52 percent for
the ﬁrm. Also, as the uncertainty increases, the strike cutoﬀ w̃ decreases slightly
as a result of the increasing strike costs. Eventually, w̃ < w0 , and the union
does better with the holdout threat than with the strike threat. At this point
(1 − l ≈ 0.62), the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ increases discontinuously. This discontinuity
raises the following question: might the ﬁrm want to raise the current wage to
avoid a strike? We address this question below.

2.2

Should the Firm Avoid a Strike by Raising the Current Wage?

A potential criticism of our model is that we do not allow the ﬁrm to avoid
a strike by raising the current wage. Because of the discontinuous increase in
the ﬁrm’s ex ante payoﬀ when the union switches from the strike threat to the
holdout threat, the ﬁrm may have an incentive to raise the current wage to w̃
to avoid a strike. Here, we allow this possibility in the context of our uniform
example. An important feature of this analysis is recognition that the ﬁrm’s
willingness to oﬀer w̃ may signal information to the union. Hence, a ﬁrm’s
incentive to raise the current wage depends on what the union will infer about
the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability if the current wage is raised.
First suppose that raising the current wage does not change the union’s
belief. The union thinks that v is drawn from the distribution F regardless of
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Figure 8: Ex Ante Allocation Of Gains From Trade.

whether the current wage is raised. In this case, the ﬁrm can avoid a strike by
raising the current wage to w̃. With w0 = w̃ , the net gain from avoiding the
strike is

∆(v) = VH (v) − VS (v) =



1
(aH − aS )m
 F (m)− 2
(aH − aS ) v −

v2
2m

− m [1 − F (m)]

ifv ≥ m
ifv < m

Note that ∆ (v) = 0 for v ≥ m, and ∆ (v) = (aH − aS )(1 − v/m) > 0 for
v < m, so the net gain is strictly increasing in v for v < m and constant for
v ≥ m. For the uniform example, it is easy to verify that for l > 0.54 the net
gain from avoiding a strike is positive for all v. Hence, with passive beliefs and
l suﬃciently large, it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for every type of ﬁrm to
raise the current wage to w̃ and avoid a strike. This equilibrium breaks down,
however, if the support of v extends below 0.54: a ﬁrm with v < 0.54 prefers
not to avoid a strike.
As an alternative, suppose that avoiding a strike by raising the current wage
signals to the union that the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability is high. In particular, suppose
the union believes that v is between l and z if the wage is not raised or between
z and h if the wage is raised, where l ≤ z ≤ h. Such a belief is reasonable, since
highly proﬁtable ﬁrms gain more from avoiding a strike. In this case, there is
an additional cost to avoiding a strike: raising the current wage signals to the
union that they should expect a higher wage. For this to be an equilibrium, it
must be that the ﬁrm prefers not to raise the wage if v ∈ [l, z] and prefers to
raise the wage if v ∈ [z, h]; but this condition is not satisﬁed for any z ∈ [l, h].
The signaling cost of raising the wage is too high; all ﬁrm types prefer to be
thought to be in the interval [l, z] by not raising the wage. To see this consider
a ﬁrm with v ∈ [z, h]. By not raising the wage, the union thinks that v ∈ [l, z]
and so oﬀers wS (m), where m ∈ (l, z); but this wage is lower than any wage
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that a ﬁrm of type v could get by signaling that v ∈ [z, h], regardless of how
long the ﬁrm holds out. Hence, if the union infers that the ﬁrm has a high v
if it raises the current wage, then the only equilibrium response is for no ﬁrm
type to raise the current wage.
An alternative to unilaterally raising the wage to avoid a strike is for the
ﬁrm to index the current wage by incorporating a cost-of-living provision in the
contract. With unanticipated inﬂation, indexation more closely maintains the
workers’ real wage and hence reduces the union’s incentive to strike, compared
with a nonindexed contract.15 Thus, indexation may reduce bargaining costs by
averting some strikes, but the cost is higher wages in future contracts. Extending
the model to a sequence of negotiations would allow for an analysis of this tradeoﬀ.

2.3

Switching Threats During Negotiations

So far, we have assumed that the union selects the threat (strike or holdout)
at the beginning of negotiations and sticks with the chosen threat until an
agreement is reached. Here, we consider how our results change if we allow
the union to switch threats during negotiations. Full-information models of
wage bargaining in which the union picks the threat each period have been
studied by Fernandez and Glazer (1991) and Haller and Holden (1990). They
show that the threat choice leads to multiple equilibria in the bargaining game.
The indeterminacy comes from the ﬁrm’s belief about which threat will be
chosen in the future. If the ﬁrm expects the union to strike in the future,
one equilibrium results; if the ﬁrm expects the union always to hold out, then
another equilibrium appears. Hence, one eﬀect of allowing a threat choice in
each period is that it leads to multiple equilibria.
One way to resolve this multiplicity is for the union to commit ex ante
to its most preferred threat path, allowing for threats that involve periods of
holdout and periods of strike. This possibility is considered in detail in Cramton
and Tracy (1991b); for brevity, we only summarize the results here. The main
result is that under Assumption S (cS = 0) within the class of ex ante threat
paths, the union’s optimal threat is either the continuous strike threat or the
continuous holdout threat. The union cannot improve its payoﬀ by adopting a
strike deadline or by switching to holdout after a period of strike. Our model
then is unaﬀected by this extension of the possible threats available to the union.
A second possibility is that the union may prefer to switch threats after the
ﬁrm has made a revealing oﬀer.16 For example, if the settlement wage under the
strike threat is higher than the settlement wage under the holdout threat, the
15 Bruce E. Kaufman (1981) argued that indexation would lower the probability of a strike
by reducing the role of divergent price expectations as a source of uncertainty in bargaining.
Gramm (1986), Gramm et al. (1988), and Mauro (1982) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of indexation
on strike incidence; however, these studies also include controls for the change in real wage
over the previous contract.
16 See

Cramton and Tracy (1991b) for details.
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union may wish to hold out until the ﬁrm has made a revealing oﬀer and then
switch to the strike threat to get the higher strike wage. In equilibrium, the ﬁrm
anticipates this possibility, which alters the incentives to reveal information and,
hence, the duration of the dispute. When the current wage w0 is near w̃ (the
point at which the union is indiﬀerent between the strike threat and the holdout
threat), the union prefers to adopt a threat of holding out until the ﬁrm makes
a revealing oﬀer and then to switch to the strike threat if the ﬁrm’s valuation
is suﬃciently high. In our benchmark case, this threat is preferred to either the
strike threat or the holdout threat for only a narrow range of w0 : w0 must be
no more than 0.4 percent below and no more than 0.8 percent above w̃. For w0
in this range, wage settlements are higher, dispute durations are nearly three
times longer, and dispute incidence is slightly reduced from what it would be
under the holdout threat. However, outside this narrow range of w0 the union
ﬁnds it best to adopt the strike threat or the holdout threat, and the analysis
is the same as before.

3

Conclusion

Disputes are a common feature of U.S. collective bargaining. In our sample data,
57 percent of the contract negotiations involve a dispute. However, less than
a quarter of these disputes ever take the form of a strike. The overwhelming
majority of disputes involve a holdout in which the old contract is extended
until a settlement is reached. This important institutional feature has been
largely overlooked in the theoretical literature on union contract negotiations.
In this paper, we address this shortcoming by presenting a bargaining model
that allows the union the choice of strike or holdout. Although no attempt is
made in this paper to test the model, we demonstrate the model’s ability to
reproduce many basic features of the data.
Expanding the union’s choice of threats to include holdouts as well as strikes
puts new emphasis on the role of the current wage under the expired contract.
The model predicts that the composition of disputes will shift from holdouts
to strikes when: (i) there has been a signiﬁcant amount of uncompensated inﬂation during the previous contract term, which decreases the worker’s wage
in the holdout threat; (ii) there has been a decline in the local unemployment
rate, which increases the worker’s reservation wage in the strike threat; and (iii)
there has been an increase in the ﬁrm’s demand, which improves proﬁtability,
thereby widening the gap between the current wage and the settlement wage.
These predictions concerning strike incidence are consistent with several empirical ﬁndings based on U.S. and Canadian negotiations.

Appendix A
Below, we derive the formulas used in the uniform example in Section 2.1.
The dispute incidence is (m−l)/(h−l). If a dispute occurs (v < m), its duration
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is found by solving for t(v) in the formula
D(v) = 1 −
to yield

1 − e−rt(v)
v
=
m
1 − e−rT


1
v
t(v) = − log j + (1 − j)
r
m

where j = e−rT . The expected duration, then, is
 m
dv
t̄ =
t(v)
m−l
l
l
1
jm + (1 − j)l
log j + (1 − j)
=
1+
r
(1 − j)(m − l)
m
The settlement rate from dispute is
j

v + m 1−j
−v  (t)
=r
R(t) =
v(t) − l
v−l
since from the formula for D(v)
v  = −r(v + m

j
).
1−j

In practice, there is heterogeneity among bargaining pairs about the level of uncertainty. Let L = {l, ..., l} be the various levels of uncertainty in the population
and assume that there are equal numbers of bargaining pairs from each level of
uncertainty. Let Rl (t) be the settlement rate at time t for subpopulation l ∈ L,
and let Pl (t) be the fraction of population l ∈ L remaining in dispute at time
t. The aggregate settlement rate, then, is found by weighting the settlement
rates for each subpopulation by the subpopulation’s size relative to the total
population still in dispute at time t:

Pl (t)Rl (t)

R(t) = l∈L
l∈L Pl (t)
where

vl (t) − l
.
h−l
The percentage wage decline during the threat θ is
Pl (t) =

ωθ = −
=r

− 1 (1 − aθ )v 
wθ (v)
= 1 2
wθ (v)
2 (1 − aθ )v + xθ

j
v + m 1−j

v+i
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where

2xθ
1 − aθ
and the average percentage decline in wages is
 m
dv
ωθ =
ωθ (v)
m
−l
l


j
i+m
1−j m − i
log
.
=r 1+
m−l
i+l
i=

The union’s expected payoﬀ is calculated from Proposition 1 to be
Uθ = xθ + (1 − aθ )m

h−m
h−l

Similarly, we can calculate the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ to be
Vθ = aθ

h+l
1
h−m
− bθ + (1 − aθ )(h + m)
2
2
h−l

and the expected loss to be
Lθ = (1 − aθ )

1
m−l
h−m
(m + l)
−m
.
2
h−l
h−l
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